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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Average gender pay gaps have absorbed the interest of economists for many years. More 
recently studies have begun to explore the degree to which observed gender wage gaps 
might differ across the wages distribution.  The stylised facts from these studies, 
summarised in the first part of the paper, are that the gender pay gap in Europe is 
typically increasing across the wages distribution. This finding - more pronounced in the 
private than the public sector - has been interpreted as a glass ceiling effect. The 
existence of this glass ceiling suggests that the average gender pay gap in Europe is 
mainly due to the gender gap towards the top of the wages distribution. What explains 
these stylised facts? We briefly outline some relevant hypotheses in the second part of the 
paper. A fundamental challenge for labour economists is to identify the extent to which 
these stylised facts are due to policies and institutions, discrimination, to other 
unobservable factors, or to fundamental differences between men and women. Finally, 
we briefly summarise the policy initiatives that might be introduced to deal with gender 
wage gaps. 
 
 
JEL codes: J31, J70 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to address a number of questions about the gender pay gap 
in Europe. The questions are necessarily focused. They concentrate on the gender pay 
gap rather than on other gender gaps in, for example, unemployment or participation in 
the informal sector.1 The first question aims to summarise some stylised facts. Are 
women really doing badly in terms of pay in European countries’ labour markets? Does 
the gender gap vary over the wages distribution and which European countries are 
doing better than others in this regard? The second question considers candidate 
explanations for these stylised facts. What might cause observed gender wages gaps to 
vary over the wages distribution? Why are there cross-country differences? Do policies 
and institutions play a role? And are there any other factors – apart from policies and 
institutions – that might explain these stylised facts? The final question in this paper 
relates to policy. Given the state of our knowledge, what further policy initiatives might 
be introduced to deal with gender wage gaps?  
The paper is set out as follows. Section 1 provides some stylised facts obtained 
from recent studies investigating the extent of glass ceilings and sticky floors across a 
number of different European countries. In Section 2, we briefly outline how policies 
and institutions might be correlated with these stylised facts. In Section 3 we summarise 
other factors that might explain the glass ceiling. Section 4 considers policy 
prescriptions and Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
 
1. Stylised facts about the glass ceiling in Europe 
Mean gender pay gaps have absorbed the interest of economists for many years and 
much important work has documented these. In the European context, many authors 
                                                 
1 See Azmat, Guell, Manning (2006). 
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have estimated gender wage gaps for particular countries and consistently find an 
average gender wage gap. Average gender wage gaps have also been extensively 
charted in cross-country studies, and some examples of these are found in Blau and 
Kahn (1992, 1996, 2003), Smith and Westergaard-Nielsen (1988), and Datta Gupta, 
Oaxaca and Smith (2006). Recently labour economists have begun to explore the 
degree to which gender wage gaps might differ across the wages distribution, using 
quantile regression (QR) techniques. These facilitate an investigation of the extent to 
which gender affects the location, scale and shape of the conditional wage distribution. 
The pioneering work in this regard is that by Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003) 
for Sweden. 2    
 
1.1. The gender pay gap in Sweden  
Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003) use 1998 Swedish data to show that the gender 
pay gap is increasing across the wages distribution and accelerating in the upper tail. 
They interpret this finding as a ‘glass ceiling’ effect, where they define a glass ceiling 
to be ‘the phenomenon whereby women do quite well in the labor market up to a point 
after which there is an effective limit on their prospects’. Clearly to observe this 
empirically one needs to investigate the gender pay gap across different parts of the 
distribution.  The fact that they observe this glass ceiling effect in Swedish data 
suggests that the average Swedish gender pay gap in the 1990s was mainly due to the 
gender gap towards the top of the wages distribution. They also use 1999 data for the 
                                                 
2 Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2006) also investigate these issues for a number of European Union 
countries, and this current paper draws on their results extensively. See also de la Rica, Dolado and 
Llorens, (2005) who use 1998 European Community Household Panel data for Spain. They stratify by 
education group, and find that the gender wage gap is expanding over the wage distribution only for the 
group with tertiary education. Miller (2005) and Kee (2006) employ a similar QR approach for workers 
in Australia, and Kee (2006) also stratifies her sample by public and private sector workers. Baron and 
Cobb-Clark (2006) use alternative estimation methods to estimate gender gaps across the wages 
distribution for Australian workers. Lucifora and Meurs (2004) use both QR and kernel techniques to 
estimate the public-private sector pay gap for men and women in France, Britain and Italy. 
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US and find a different result for that country. In particular, they find that the mean 
gender wage gap in the US is larger than in Sweden but that the gender wage gap at the 
top of the Swedish wage distribution is far larger than the corresponding gap in the US. 
To some, this is surprising result, since the family-friendly policies encapsulated in the 
Swedish welfare state have been the envy of women everywhere. However, Datta 
Gupta, Smith and Verner (2006) suggest that the Nordic model might have 
“boomerang” effects that can exacerbate gender wage gaps.3    
The study by Albrecht et al (2003) is important, since it shows not only that the 
mean gender pay gap disguises differences across the wage distribution, but also that 
the gender pay gap is increasing across the distribution. But are these results for 
Sweden peculiar to that country, or are they also found in other European countries? To 
answer this question, we now turn to the study by Arulamapalam, Booth and Bryan 
(2005) using harmonised data from the European Community Household Panel Survey. 
 
2.1. The gender pay gap in other European countries 
Are there sticky floors as well as glass ceilings?  
Although in Sweden the gender pay gap is biggest at the top of the wage distribution, a 
priori there does not seem to be any compelling theoretical reason why this should be 
the case. Indeed, there are reasons why it might be wider at the bottom rather than – or 
as well as -  the top. For example, women towards the bottom might have less 
bargaining power or be more subject to firm’s market power than comparable men. 
                                                 
3 Datta Gupta et al. (2006) argue that, while the Nordic (ie Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden) family-friendly schemes make women more economically independent of their partners, there 
can be negative boomerang effects since mothers on average take much longer periods of leave than 
fathers. This reduces their experience capital relative to men. Moreover selection by females into the 
public sector, with its better family-friendly policy provision, exacerbates the overall gender pay gap, 
especially at the top of the wage distribution. See Pylkkänen and Smith (2004) for a comparison of the 
impact of family-friendly policies in Denmark and Sweden on mothers' careers. 
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This could be due to unobservable family commitments, or to social custom whereby 
the man’s career takes precedence. Alternatively minimum wage compliance at the 
bottom may be unequal across gender, or trade unions might differentially represent the 
interests of their female electorate at the bottom. The situation where the gender pay 
gap widens at the bottom of the wage distribution is defined in Arulampalam et al 
(2005) as a sticky floor, although elsewhere this term has been used in a slightly 
different sense.4  
 
The Arulamapalam, Booth and Bryan (2007) study 
This study exploited data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 
collected annually since 1994 in a standardized format facilitating cross-country 
comparisons. The authors estimated each specification separately by country and by 
gender. They reported estimates for both public and private sectors combined, as well 
as separate estimates by sector. We discuss only the latter here.5 The public sector, 
being isolated from the rigours of a market economy, could in principle more easily 
follow “tastes for discrimination”. But the public sector is also subject to government 
objectives and policies which are typically held to work against discrimination. To the 
extent that gender wage gaps reflect discrimination, this could work against gender pay 
gaps being higher in the public sector.6 
Column [2] of Table 1 shows the male proportion working in the public sector for 
each of the eleven countries in the sample, while Column [4] shows the corresponding 
                                                 
4 Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003) first defined a sticky floor as the situation arising where otherwise 
identical men and women might be appointed to the same pay scale or rank, but the women are appointed 
at the bottom and men further up the scale. Such a strategy can evade some discrimination laws, since the 
appointment rank is the same. Arulampalam et al (2006) use the term more generally to describe the 
situation where the gender pay gap widens at the bottom of the wages distribution.  
5 Women might self-select into the public sector, especially if family-friendly policies are better provided 
there. However estimates using the combined samples yielded similar results. 
6 See Lucifora and Meurs (2004) and references therein for an extensive discussion of public and private 
sector pay. They use QR and kernel techniques to estimate the public-private sector pay gap for men and 
women in France, Britain and Italy. 
 4
male proportion in the private sector. The estimating sub-samples comprised full-time 
and part-time employees between the ages of 22-54 years inclusive, who were working 
at least 15 hours per week, and who were not employed in agriculture.7 Notice that the 
public sector has a majority female workforce in 7 of the 11 countries. (Only in Austria, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain are men in the majority and the majority is slim). In contrast, 
men predominate in the private sector across all countries. In 7 countries they account 
for 60% or more of the private sector workforce. 
 
Table 1: Raw gender wage gap by sector 
 Public  Private  
[1] 
Country 
[2] 
Males 
(%) 
 
[3]  
Mean 
wage gap  
 
[4] 
Males 
(%) 
[5] 
Mean 
wage gap  
 
Austria 51.9 0.135  60.6 0.292  
Belgium 47.8 0.073  57.7 0.137  
Britain 34.9 0.212  56.4 0.306  
Denmark 33.6 0.114  63.6 0.134  
Finland 35.0 0.259  60.0 0.167  
France 45.1 0.116  58.8 0.202  
Germany 43.2 0.128  62.4 0.262  
Ireland  52.1 0.110  56.6 0.273  
Italy 51.3 0.006  63.8 0.153  
Netherlands 48.1 0.200  64.3 0.208  
Spain 52.7 0.054  65.4 0.230  
 
Source: Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2006). Figures in italics are statistically insignificant 
from  zero. All other reported figures are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Now consider the mean gender wage gaps, reported in columns [3] and [5] of Table 
1. Inspection of these columns reveals that the raw average wage gap is higher in the 
private sector than the public sector in all countries except for Finland. In the 
Netherlands, the difference is small, with a private sector gender gap of 0.208 as 
                                                 
7 This age restriction was chosen to minimise selectivity issues associated with cross-country differences 
in labour force participation of younger and older workers, which might depend on country-specific 
educational and early retirement systems. The restriction of working at least 15 hours per week necessary 
because of data, as explained at length in Arulamapalam et al (2005). 
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compared with 0.200 in the public sector.  But in, for example Austria, the gender gap 
is 0.135 in the public sector and 0.292 in the private sector. The largest gender pay gap 
in the private sector is in Britain. In the public sector in Italy there is no gender pay gap.  
But of course these figures are based only on the raw data. Next we turn to a 
summary of the QR-based estimates of the public sector wage gap reported in 
Arulampalam et al (2006). These were calculated following the Machado and Mata 
(2005) decomposition method. The calculated wage gap measures the effect of different 
returns to men and women when women’s attributes were used in the counterfactual 
decomposition. 
 
   TABLE 2: ESTIMATED WAGE GAP, PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
 Quantile regression estimates 
OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Austria 0.227 0.153 0.140 0.190 0.239 0.289 
Belgium 0.122 0.065 0.072 0.099 0.141 0.209 
Britain 0.176 0.109 0.138 0.182 0.192 0.241 
Denmark 0.089 0.058 0.063 0.084 0.122 0.181 
Finland 0.255 0.158 0.192 0.247 0.298 0.313 
France 0.172 0.145 0.130 0.146 0.189 0.273 
Germany 0.099 0.058 0.072 0.102 0.137 0.167 
Ireland 0.177 0.167 0.153 0.161 0.163 0.186 
Italy 0.086 0.031 0.037 0.072 0.125 0.169 
Netherlands 0.142 0.049 0.088 0.131 0.183 0.235 
Spain 0.077 0.102 0.096 0.082 0.040 0.062 
Source: Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2006). Table 
Notes: (a) Regressions include controls for training, age, education, tenure, marital status, health, 
unemployment experience, part-time, fixed term & casual contracts, region (where possible), sector, 
year. (b) All reported coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
The first column of Table 2 gives the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 
the mean public sector wage gap. Including all the controls reported under the table, the 
average gender wage gap varies from a low of around 8% in Spain followed by 9% in 
Denmark, up to a high of 26% in Finland. But do these average estimates disguise 
differences across the wages distribution and is the gender pay gap increasing across 
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the distribution, as was found for Sweden by Albrecht et al (2003)? The answer is an 
unambiguous yes, as inspection of the QR estimates reveals. Even when men and 
women have the same distributions of characteristics, there is a positive gender gap 
across the wages distribution due to different returns. And all of these are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. As an example, consider Finland, a country that is 
geographically close to Sweden. This also happens to be the country with the highest 
gender wage gap at the 90th percentile – a staggering 31% - and with the second highest 
gap at the bottom. The gap is about 16% at the 10th percentile. Only Ireland is slightly 
worse at the 10th percentile. Denmark – also geographically close to Sweden – exhibits 
the same glass ceiling phenomenon. However the Danish gender gap is much smaller 
than in Finland, ranging from around 6% at the 10th percentile up to around 18% at the 
90th. 
Notice also that in nine countries (all except Ireland and Spain), the public 
sector gender gap is highest at the 90th percentile. There is clearly a widespread ‘glass 
ceiling’ in the public sector in these 11 countries. The wage gap increases 
monotonically in 7 countries (Belgium, Finland, Britain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands). Finally, observe that there is only relatively weak evidence of a public 
sector sticky floor. In Austria, France, Ireland and Spain the gender pay gap at the 10th 
percentile is slightly higher than the gender pay gap at the 25th percentile.  
Table 3 summarises the Arulampalam et al. (2007) estimates of the private 
sector wage gap. Again these measure the effect of different returns to men and women 
when women’s attributes were used in the counterfactual decomposition. The first 
column of Table 3 gives the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the mean public 
sector wage gap. The remaining columns give the QR estimates. The other controls 
included in estimation are reported in the notes under the table. The OLS estimates 
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reveal that the average private sector wage gap gender varies from a low of around 12% 
in Denmark, up to a high of 25% in Britain and Austria.  
 
  TABLE 3: ESTIMATED WAGE GAP, PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Quantile regression estimates 
OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Austria 0.251 0.212 0.207 0.215 0.233 0.269 
Belgium 0.144 0.090 0.120 0.144 0.174 0.218 
Britain 0.247 0.201 0.224 0.246 0.272 0.302 
Denmark 0.118 0.045 0.081 0.110 0.163 0.209 
Finland 0.211 0.134 0.165 0.207 0.250 0.284 
France 0.234 0.197 0.174 0.189 0.236 0.294 
Germany 0.162 0.139 0.142 0.146 0.159 0.200 
Ireland 0.230 0.185 0.215 0.240 0.256 0.269 
Italy 0.172 0.156 0.138 0.146 0.169 0.205 
Netherlands 0.127 0.029 0.068 0.107 0.172 0.249 
Spain 0.211 0.214 0.211 0.207 0.202 0.205 
Source: Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007).  
Notes: (a) Regressions include controls for training, age, education, tenure, marital status, health, 
unemployment experience, part-time, fixed term & casual contracts, region (where possible), sector, year. 
(b) All reported coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
A comparison of the OLS and QR estimates reveals that the average estimates 
disguise differences across the private sector wage distribution. Even when men and 
women have the same characteristics, there is a positive and increasing gender gap 
across the wages distribution due to different returns. All of these estimates are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The other important point to draw 
from Table 3 is that in the private sector there are very large wage gaps compared to 
public sector. In most countries  - indeed, in all except for Spain – the private sector 
gender wage gap is highest at the 90th percentile. And the country with the dubious 
distinction of having the highest wage gap at the 90th percentile is Britain, followed by 
France and then Finland. The country with the biggest gap between the 10th and the 90th 
percentile is the Netherlands. 
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Is there any evidence of sticky floors in the private sector? There is some evidence 
in Austria, Italy and Spain. In France there is rather stronger evidence, since at the 10th 
percentile the wage gap is 20%  while at the 25th percentile it is 17%. For Italy, the 
same comparison yields 16% with 14%. 
 
A note on occupation and industry 
Albrecht et al. (2003) emphasized the potential endogeniety of occupation and industry, 
and therefore estimated specifications with and without these controls. Arulampalam et 
al. (2006) also followed this procedure. On the one hand, one might wish to omit 
industrial and occupational controls on the grounds of (i) potential endogeneity, and (ii) 
employers’ or unions’ “discriminatory” practices are likely to be correlated with 
occupation and industry (and hence by including them we under-estimate the true effect 
of discrimination).  But on the other hand, one might wish to include industrial and 
occupational controls, since they may embody otherwise unmeasured industry-specific 
and occupation-specific human capital. Arulampalam et al. (2006) suggest that 
estimates without such controls (and thereby ignoring the potential effect of otherwise 
unobserved human capital) might be viewed as upper bound for the extent of 
“discrimination”. Estimates with such controls might instead be viewed as a lower 
bound for the extent of “discrimination”. 
However, Arulampalam et al. (2006) found that their inclusion does not greatly 
change result that glass ceilings are widespread. This may suggest that occupational and 
industry controls not picking up heterogeneity in discriminatory practices towards 
women. But there were some notable exceptions. For example, with the inclusion of 
industry and occupation dummies, the private sector pay gap at the 90th percentile in 
Britain and Finland reduce from 30% and 28% respectively to around 23% and 21% . 
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The stylised facts about the glass ceiling in Europe 
Albrecht et al. (2003) used 1998 Swedish data to show that the gender pay gap is 
increasing across the wages distribution – the ‘glass ceiling’ effect. Arulampalam et al. 
(2006) found a similar result in all of the eleven separate European countries they 
examined. They also showed that, while the magnitude of the glass ceiling differs 
across sector (public or private), it is everywhere apparent.8   
But what causes these glass ceilings? Do they arise on the demand side through 
discriminatory practices? Or are there other forms of unobserved heterogeneity, perhaps 
arising on the supply side from the traditional female role within the family? Next we 
turn to an examination of the potential causes of observed glass ceilings and sticky 
floors. 
 
2.  What role do policies and institutions play?  
In this section we initially briefly discuss how policies and institutions might contribute 
to the glass ceiling and sticky floor effects. Then in the subsequent section we shall 
move on to consider what other factors – apart from policies and institutions – might 
explain the stylised facts summarised in Section 2 above. 
 
2.1. Policies and institutions 
Gender-specific policies - such as equal opportunities and anti-discrimination laws, 
parental leave provisions and the availability of child care – are likely to affect gender 
wage gaps, both mean gaps and gaps across the wages distribution. Gender wage gaps 
are also likely to be influenced by wage-setting institutions that do not directly impinge 
                                                 
8 In a study also using QR techniques, Kee (2006) finds that the gender pay gap in Australia is constant in 
the public sector and increasing across the wages distribution in the private sector. 
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on gender, such as those governing collective bargaining and minimum wages. 
Differences in such policies and institutions across Europe may well contribute to 
observed cross-country variations in gender wage gaps across the wages distribution.  
 
2.2. Gender-specific policies affecting women directly 
Although equal opportunities and discrimination are proscribed by legislation, they 
might not be effectively implemented. If only the more articulate and better educated 
women take legal action to combat discrimination, the impact of these policies might 
work against glass ceilings. And if less educated women are less likely to take recourse 
to legal action, the gender pay gap could widen at the bottom of the distribution.  
Another important set of gender-specific policies are those that are so-called 
“family-friendly”. There are many types of these, but perhaps the two most important 
are maternity leave policies and state-provided childcare for pre-school children. We 
briefly consider each of these in turn.  
It is well-recognised that leave policies could be a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand they might raise women’s relative earnings by preserving their ties with the firm, 
thereby increasing incentives to invest in specific human capital and leading to higher 
female pay. We will term this a beneficial effect. But on the other hand, generous leave 
policies could increase women’s time out of workforce for childbearing, resulting in 
relatively lower experience capital and thus widening the average gender pay gap for 
that group. We will term this an adverse effect, whilst bearing in mind that it might not 
be adverse from the child’s perspective. Empirical research tends to find a beneficial 
effect of short leaves on women’s wages but an adverse effect for long leaves (Ruhm, 
1998; Waldfogel, 1998; add European refs).  
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But why should these leave policies affect gender wage gaps across the wages 
distribution? We might expect a priori that women at the bottom might be less attached 
to the workforce, and so the beneficial impact of leave policies increasing women’s 
attachment to firms might dominate the adverse effect outlined above. But ultimately it 
is an empirical question as to what effect dominates - and in which countries.  
A second important type of family-friendly policy is formal childcare for pre-school 
children. This might be expected to have a beneficial effect on women’s wages, since it 
is likely to increase women’s attachment to firms. This in turn will increase the 
incentives to make specific skills investments. Moreover, formal childcare might act to 
encourage women back to work earlier than otherwise possible. Thus the “experience” 
capital and human capital of affected individuals is likely to increase. We would 
therefore expect the provision of formal childcare to reduce the gender pay gap, all else 
equal. However, subsidised childcare is also likely to attract into the workforce those 
women who are the least committed to market production. The associated selectivity 
effect may then actually increase the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wages 
distribution – what we have termed the adverse effect. 
Arulampalam et al (2006) performed some cross-country comparisons of 
correlations between their estimated glass ceilings or sticky floors on the one hand, and 
several separate proxies for institutional differences on the other hand.  In this context, 
glass ceilings were measured by the difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles 
while sticky floors were measured by the difference between the 10th and the 50th 
percentiles. The results are summarised in Table 4 below.  
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Each cell in Table 4 presents the result of a separate regression. The summary 
policy variable in Row A is the OECD Work-family Reconciliation Index (WRI).9  
Consider the intersection of Row A and Column [1]. The entry “positive” indicates that 
the glass ceiling is increasing in the Work-family Reconciliation Index (the t-statistic is 
3.2). Countries with higher family-friendly policies have a bigger pay gap at the top of 
the wages distribution. This suggests that the adverse effect referred to above dominates 
the beneficial effect at the top of the distribution in this sample of eleven European 
countries.   
Next consider the intersection of Row A and Column [2]. The entry “negative” 
indicates that the sticky floor is declining in the index (the t-statistic  is  -2.7). The fact 
that, across countries, the work-family index is negatively correlated with sticky floors 
suggests that the beneficial effect dominates at the bottom of the distribution.   
Table 4: Correlations- glass ceilings/sticky floors by institutions  
 
 
Row 
 
 
Institution 
[1] 
Glass ceiling  
(90-50 diff) 
[2] 
Sticky floor  
(10-50 diff) 
[3] 
Ave. gender 
wage gap 
A Work-family 
reconciliation index 
Positive 
 
Negative Negative 
     
B Wage dispersion Negative Positive Positive 
     
C Union coverage Positive Positive Positive 
     
Note: Summary of results in Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007). There were 11 country-
observations for the wage dispersion measure, and 9 for the union measure (no data available for 
Ireland and Italy). 
 
The dispersion of the wage distribution 
Albrecht et al. (2003) suggested an additional reason for the Swedish glass ceiling 
phenomenon. This is the relatively high wages at the bottom of the wage distribution 
                                                 
9 The OECD Work-family Reconciliation Index is the sum of indicators for the coverage of the under-3s 
in formal childcare, maternity leave, flexi-time, voluntary part-time and one half of the extra-statutory 
leave by firms indicator (see OECD, 2001; p152). 
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making it ‘very difficult for career-oriented women to hire household help or help with 
child care’, especially for the very young children under 12 months who cannot be 
admitted into daycare. For this reason, women might be found in less-demanding jobs 
and thus fall substantially behind men towards the top of the distribution. 
  Arulampalam et al. (2006) investigated this by looking at cross-country 
correlations between the magnitude of the glass ceiling and the dispersion of the wages 
distribution. This is shown in Row B of Table 4. Wage dispersion is measured by the 
90th-10th percentile differential of log wages in the full sample of workers in each 
country. There is indeed a statistically significant negative correlation that is consistent 
with this hypothesis (the t-statistic on the log wage dispersion measure in the glass 
ceiling regression is -4.1.)  
 
2.3. Pay-bargaining institutions  
Trade unions may be less likely to represent the interests of their female electorate - 
who may be perceived as having a marginal attachment to the workforce – than of the 
male electorate. In addition, collective bargaining and associated institutions affect the 
wage structure in general.10 To the extent that the wages distribution is compressed, 
they may thus impinge indirectly on women’s wages and through this mechanism affect 
the gender pay gap. Minimum wages and high wages floors might increase the 
likelihood women stay in workforce, because of the higher opportunity cost of time out, 
and they might therefore have higher levels of work experience and skills acquisition. 
                                                 
10 Countries with higher levels of unionisation and more centralized or coordinated bargaining also tend 
to have lowest wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2003; Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors, 
2001). This is likely to lower the gender pay gap  – perhaps especially at the bottom of the wages 
distribution. In all the countries Arulampalam et al. examined, the female wage lies below the male 
across the entire wages distribution. Hence centralized pay bargaining systems that raise the minimum 
level of pay regardless of gender are also likely to lower the gender pay gap ceteris paribus.   
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Whether these effects on the gender pay gap vary across the wages distribution is 
ultimately an empirical issue 
The institution in Row C of Table 4 is union coverage. The results summarised 
in Row C reveal a positive correlation between the magnitude of the glass ceiling and 
union coverage, and also between the magnitude of the sticky floor and union coverage. 
However, none of these estimated relationships is statistically significant.  
Next we turn to a brief overview of other potentially important causes of glass 
ceilings. 
 
3. What other factors might explain glass ceilings? 
A fundamental challenge for labour economists is to identify the extent to which 
observed gender differences in labour market outcomes are due to discrimination, or to 
other unobservable factors, or to fundamental differences between men and women. We 
briefly outline some relevant hypotheses in this section. 
Many labour markets are hierarchical, and promotions and appointments procedures 
can exacerbate gender pay gaps.  While promotions are typically subject to well-
defined procedures, especially in larger organisations, exactly where in the rank-
specific salary scale a successful candidate is appointed can depend on discrimination 
and individual negotiation in addition to experience (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 
2003).11 If promotions procedures favour men rather than women towards the top of the 
wages distribution, then the gender pay gap might be bigger towards the top.  Moreover, 
promotion criteria can act to perpetuate gender gaps. Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor 
(1996) show, in their study of US law firms, how criteria for promotion like excessively 
                                                 
11 Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2005), using data on promotions from the British Household Panel 
Survey, found that women gained less from promotions than did men, ceteris paribus. 
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long hours of work can exacerbate gender pay gaps towards the top of the lawyers’ 
wage distribution.  
Discrimination at the hiring stage can also matter, not least because it can affect 
women’s willingness to bargain over offered wages. Suppose that women have a lower 
probability of being offered a particular job – for example playing in an orchestra. In an 
interesting paper, Goldin and Rouse (2000) demonstrated that blind audition procedures 
can result in a higher proportion of female members of symphony orchestras. Although 
Goldin and Rouse did not address relative salaries, consider the following scenario. 
Suppose a woman has overcome the hiring barrier for the organisation where she 
wishes to work and has actually got offered a job. Given this is hard – hiring procedures 
are not always impartial, as Goldin and Rouse demonstrated -  it is possible that the 
woman is so grateful for the job offer that she will not bargain as aggressively as 
comparable men for her starting salary. The book by Babcock and Lashever (2003) - 
Women Don’t Ask - has numerous instances of interviewed women were in exactly this 
situation. 
This example serves to emphasise the potential importance of bargaining. And it is 
well known from bargaining theory that one’s share of the cake in a bargained outcome 
is increasing in one’s fall-back option. If women are less likely to get outside offers, 
then they are in a weaker position with regard to bargaining. Later we shall return to the 
question of whether or not they are willing to bargain on their own account anyway. 
But first we shall consider an empirical study attempting to get a handle on outside 
offers in one particular labour market – that for academic economists. 
Using a unique UK data source on academic economists’ labour market experiences, 
Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) investigated gender differences in pay and 
promotions. They found a gender promotions gap and a within-rank gender pay gap, 
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controlling for a host of factors including career breaks, best career-publications, and a 
measure of outside offers. They also found that men receive more outside offers and 
gain higher pay responses. Why might this be the case? Universities in the UK are non-
profit institutions, and hence more able to follow tastes for discrimination on the one 
hand. But on the other hand, the UK government and the EU have adopted a strong 
position in favour of equal opportunities. Blackaby et al. suggested their findings 
supported the loyal servant hypothesis. Women might be less aggressive in asking for 
pay rises. The Blackaby et al. results were also consistent with a model in which 
universities are paying women less as a cost-miminising strategy rather than as a taste 
for discrimination. They suggested that market economy is thus unlikely to eliminate 
these differentials.  
Any rational employer will pay its individual workers as little as it can get away 
with provided productivity is unaffected. But is the gender pay gap declining with the 
feminization of occupation? And is it declining if there are more high-level women in 
the organization? We have already seen, from Albrecht et al. (2003) and the cross-
country estimates of Arulampalam et al. (2006), that the inclusion of occupational and 
industry controls made little difference to the glass ceiling results with only a couple of 
exceptions. But what about the proportion of women within the organization? Women 
may do better in organisations in which there is already a high proportion of females. 
They may prefer to work with similar individuals; they may gain from mentoring 
opportunities and they may benefit from female networks. 
Bell (2005) uses the US ExecuComp dataset that contains information on total 
compensation for the top five highest paid executives of a large group of US firms for 
the period 1992-2003. She uses these data to estimate the impact of women-leaders on 
the careers of other executive women. She finds that women executives working in 
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women-led firms earn 15-20% more in total compensation than women working in 
other firms, ceteris paribus. Women-led firms also hire proportionately more top 
women executives. This is consistent with the notion of mentoring or networking by 
women.12 She concludes in favour of “affirmative action at the very top of the corporate 
hierarchy”.13  
We mentioned above that there might be gender differences in willingness to 
bargain over wages. These would have to become more important towards the top of 
the wage distribution for this hypothesis to contribute to explaining the glass ceiling 
effect.  It is possible that women towards the bottom have their wages set by pay-
bargaining awards while those towards the top have their wages set by individual 
negotiation. If this is the case, then the fact that “women don’t ask” could contribute to 
the glass ceiling. In their thought-provoking and important book, Babcock and 
Lashever (2003) provide a battery of evidence from psychology studies and their own 
interviews with women to support their thesis that women are unwilling to bargain on 
their own account, although being very competent at doing so for others. Babcock and 
Lashever argue that historically women were accustomed to work without pay at a type 
of work devalued by every objective financial measure – home production. Hence 
women are relatively unaccustomed to evaluating their time and abilities in economic 
terms. They suggest that society needs to change its attitudes towards women who 
assert themselves and encourage women to speak up for what they deserve. Perhaps it 
comes as no surprise (at least one of the authors is at a business school) that they 
suggest negotiation courses to help women to negotiate pay. They also argue that 
                                                 
12 Bell also notes her findings could be consistent with heterogeneity across firms in their “women-
friendliness” and that her observed positive correlation may thus not be causal. However, she also finds 
that the relationship between female headed firms and women exec’s outcomes is independent of the 
share of female directors. She also rejects the notion of sorting of higher-quality women into women-led 
firms on the grounds that there is no evidence for this in the data. For estimation of gender wage gaps 
from the ExecuComp dataset for the period 1992-7, see Bertrand and Hallock.  
13 See Holzer (2006) for a survey of studies exploring the effectiveness of affirmative action in the US. 
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companies could benefit from adopting affirmative action, not least since it would 
reduce turnover.14  
 Next we turn to a consideration of possible personality differences between 
women and men. A relatively recent and rapidly growing literature aims to investigate 
if women and men differ systematically in some unobserved characteristic that might 
contribute towards observed gender pay gaps. Examples include of such unobservables 
might include risk aversion, competitiveness, and cooperation. Of course it is extremely 
hard to disentangle to what degree such attributes are formed by society rather than 
being innate – the old nurture vs. nature debate. Croson and Gneezy (2004) survey the 
experimental economics literature that investigates preferences differences between 
women and men. They focus on risk aversion, cooperative behaviour (which they refer 
to as “social preferences”) and competitiveness. They find that men tend to be more 
risk-taking in general, although an exception was found for female financial advisors 
who were no different from men.  
Suppose now that women really are innately more risk averse than men. Then, 
so the argument goes, women will be less in evidence in areas where risk-loving is 
desirable. CEOs are the classic example of where taking risks is viewed as being 
efficient for the firm, and the rationale for stock options for CEOs is precisely to induce 
this sort of behaviour. So we might expect to see – and indeed we do – that there are 
relatively few female CEOs. But there is an important corollary which has not been 
highlighted in this literature. There are also a number of high-level jobs where risk-
aversion is valuable. Some obvious examples are flying aircraft, operating space flights, 
running a country, or being in charge of the nuclear deterrent button. Yet we rarely 
                                                 
14 They cite the experience of the accountancy and consulting firm Deloitte and Touche, who in 1991 
decided to embark on cultural change in favour of women. This makes a fascinating case study of how 
within-company attitudes towards women can be changed. 
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observe women in these jobs. This could be due to cultural factors. Or it could be that 
women do not apply for them, perhaps due to social conditioning. Or it could be 
because men are inherently more competitive and wish to keep these jobs for 
themselves.15  
What do experimental studies find about gender differences in competitiveness? 
Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment in which 
university students (half the group were female, half male) were asked to solve mazes 
on a computer. The rewards could take the form of either ‘winner takes all’ (a 
tournament), or piece rates. When men and women were paid piece rates, there were no 
significant gender differences in performance. But in a mixed-sex tournament, they 
found men performed better relative to the benchmark, but women’s performance was 
unaffected. In contrast, in a single-sex tournament, the mean performance of women 
increased. Thus women under-perform only when competing against men and not in 
same-sex scenarios. Gneezy et al. suggested that women might dislike competing with 
men, or that perhaps they feel less competent than men and this depresses their 
performance.16  They argue that single sex tournaments represent a strong form of 
affirmative action, since the proportion of women among winners reflects the gender 
composition of the participant pool (50%), whereas in mixed sex tournaments only 
about 20% of winners are women. They also found that this change in the composition 
of winners involved no loss of performance. In contrast to the study summarized below, 
this was not due to gender differences in risk aversion. 
Datta Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (2005) distinguished between competition 
and risk aversion in their experiment based on a number of French-based undergraduate 
                                                 
15 For an interesting perspective on the position of women from hunter gatherer societies through to 
agriculturally based societies, see Paul Seabright’s 2005 Royal Economic Society lecture. See also John 
Stuart Mill (1869). 
16 Of course it is also possible that women have been conditioned to believe that they should not do better 
than men in mixed sex environments, in case it affects their marriage/partnering prospects. 
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students. Before performing a task, the subjects chose whether to perform under a 
competitive payment scheme (tournament) or a non-competitive payment scheme 
(piece rate). Women were less likely than men to choose the competitive payment 
scheme. While many men and women were found to be overconfident about relative 
ability, this did not affect their choices. Instead, risk aversion was found to matter for 
women in their choice of payment scheme but not for men. A man’s choice depended 
on whether he interacted with a male or female co-participant. When facing a woman, 
the man competed more if he believed that women compete too. But if the co-
participant was male, the man competed regardless of his beliefs about men's entry rate 
into the competition.17  
What about cooperative behavioural differences between men and women?  The 
Croson and Gneezy (2004) survey shows that the experimental evidence on social 
preferences is mixed. Clearly the jury is still out on this. While these studies are 
interesting and important, we are still a long way off being able to conclude that the 
glass ceiling in Europe is due to different male and female social preferences. 
Do studies based on individual-level survey data with information about 
preferences and attitudes offer a way forward? Clearly the use of contemporaneous 
measures of risk-aversion, self-esteem and competitive/collaborative behavioural traits 
is dogged by potential endogeneity. For interesting studies attempting to address these 
issues, see Vella (1994), Swaffield (2000) and Manning and Swaffield (2005). Manning 
and Swaffield (2005) aim to explore the issue of gender differences in psychological 
factors. For some of their estimation, they focus on otherwise identical, fully “work-
committed” women and men (those with no children, no intention of having children, 
and with continuous full-time work experience). They find that, on labour market entry, 
                                                 
17 The authors speculate that this may be due to social norms and possibly evolutionary factors. 
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the gender wage gap is zero. But after 10 years, there is a 12 log points wage gap that is 
unaffected by occupation. Manning and Swaffield then exploit information on self-
esteem measured at age 10, which shows that males at this age have higher self-esteem 
than females. But self-esteem at age 10, while statistically significant, explains only a 
small proportion of the subsequent gender gap. While we clearly need more studies 
investigating these issues, it does seem probable that gender differences in these 
psychological factors will be unable to explain all of the gender pay gap. 
Finally, we turn to discrimination. Expectations of family formation and fertility 
are private information. Employers base their behaviour on averages. For this reason 
women may not get pay increases, they may not get promoted when they deserve to, 
and they may not get offered the jobs they deserve. Moreover their willingness to 
pursue outside offers and their ability to accept these may also differ from that of men, 
reinforcing their poorer position in the labour market.  
 
4. What are the policy implications? 
There is no unique policy solution to the problems of the gender pay gap and the glass 
ceiling in Europe. Instead it would seem that policies should be formulated in a number 
of areas. For instance, affirmative action has the potential to change the proportion of 
females at higher levels in the public and private sectors. This could have knock-on 
effects through mentoring of more junior females, networks and the like. Companies’ 
personnel departments clearly have a lot of scope for action in this regard if they wish 
to change intra-firm cultural attitudes. Pay bargaining and negotiation skills might also 
be offered by colleges and universities to final year students (it seems unlikely firms 
would introduce these). Moreover, childcare for preschool children could be expanded 
in those countries in which it is weak, which would potentially have the additional 
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effect of improving a country’s stock of human capital. Tax incentives might also be 
offered in this regard, as introduced recently by the UK government.18 (These policies 
might also have an additional effect of raising fertility rates, since they lower the cost of 
children.) 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The paper summarised some stylised facts about the gender pay gap in a number of 
European Union countries, and showed that in each country this varies over the wages 
distribution. While some countries are doing better than others in this regard, almost 
without exception the gender pay gap was largest towards the top of the wages 
distribution. This glass ceiling effect is bigger in the private sector than in the public. 
The paper also outlined a number of possible explanations for these stylised facts. 
Policies and institutions appear to play a role. There may well be other factors with 
which economists have only relatively recently begun to grapple – such as culture, 
social custom, bargaining skills and perhaps preferences – that could play a part. 
Nonetheless, it also seems highly likely that discrimination contributes towards gender 
pay gaps and the glass ceiling in Europe. 
 
                                                 
18 In the UK recently a scheme has been introduced whereby Childcare Vouchers are Tax and National 
Insurance exempt for the amount £55 per week. See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/childcare/ . In addition, 
since April 2004 all three and four year olds have been entitled to a free, part-time early education place. 
Initially capped at being free for twelve and a half hours per week, this is soon to be extended to fifteen 
hours. See http://www.surestart.gov.uk/improvingquality/guidance/freenurseryeducation/. 
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